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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Government traditionally has enjoyed sovereign
immunity from tort liability.1 In 1946, however, Congress waived this
immunity2 by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).3 The
FTCA gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over any claims
for personal injury or death caused by the negligence of any govern-
mental employee." This broad waiver of immunity, however, is subject
to certain exceptions. 5 Although Congress made no explicit exception
for noncombat claims of servicemembers, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Feres v. United States' construed the FTCA as creat-
ing an exception that bars all claims for injuries to servicemembers
when the injuries are "incident to service."17 This judicially created ex-
ception,8 known as the Feres doctrine, has been criticized extensively
by lower federal courts and commentators.9 Even the Court itself has
1. For more information on the history of sovereign immunity in the United States, see gen-
erally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
131, at 1033 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON], and Pound, The Tort Claims Act:
Reason or History?, 30 NACCA L.J. 404, 406-09 (1964).
2. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 1034; Pound, supra note 1, at 409.
3. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680
(1982)).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
5. See id. § 2680(a)-(n).
6. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
7. The Supreme Court has failed to define clearly the term "incident to service" and thus has
failed to create a clear-cut test. The Feres Court merely stated that the Government was not liable
under the FTCA for "injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service." Id. at 146.
8. See Weisgall, Feres Holding Lives: Split Court Upholds Limit on Liability, Legal Times,
Sept. 7, 1987, at 20, col. 2 [hereinafter Feres Holding Lives].
9. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984). For criticism of the Feres doctrine, see Sanchez v. United
States, 813 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1987), modified, 839 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988); Mondelli v. United
States, 711 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Monaco v. United
States, 661 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Hunt v. United States,
636 F.2d 580, 588-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980); and Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir.
1980). See also Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 383 (1985); Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REV.
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struggled with the original rationales supporting the doctrine."0 Over
the last four decades, the Court has rejected its original rationales and
adopted a new "military discipline" rationale, which serves as the
predominate justification for the doctrine. 1 The Supreme Court's in-
consistent use of this rationale in relation to the definition of incident
to service12 currently is creating confusion in the lower federal courts.13
For example, in Shearer v. United States (Shearer II)1 4 the Su-
preme Court used the military discipline rationale in order to bring ac-
tivity that normally would not be considered incident to service under
the Feres bar. On a case-by-case basis, Shearer 11's military discipline
analysis focuses on the claim's possible impact on the effectiveness of
military discipline to determine whether the activity was incident to
service. After Shearer II, the lower federal courts applied this same mil-
itary discipline analysis to allow recovery. In a complete turnaround,
the Court in United States v. Johnson (Johnson III)"5 condemned the
lower courts' application of this analysis.
In Johnson III the Supreme Court also followed a result-oriented
approach and denied recovery. The Court's decision, which included a
scathing dissent, reaffirmed and expanded Feres to include suits against
civilian government employees who play an integral role in military ac-
tivities. By reaffirming Feres, commentators believe that Johnson III
316 (1954); Note, From Feres to StenceL Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recov-
ery?, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1099 (1979). For further citation, see United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct.
2063, 2074 n. (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a contrary analysis of the Feres doctrine, see
Bernott, Fairness and Feres: A Critique of the Presumption of Injustice, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
51 (1987); and Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of "Incident to
Service," 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 485 (1982) [hereinafter Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine].
The Supreme Court, however, consistently has reaffirmed Feres. See United States v. Johnson, 107
S. Ct. 2063, 2068-69 (1987); Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
10. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985).
11. While the military discipline rationale was not one of the three original rationales in the
Feres case, it was developed in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). The Brown Court
stated that one of the rationales for the Feres doctrine was "the effects of the maintenance of such
suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act
were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty."
Id. For further discussion, see infra notes 73, 74 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2069;
Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 57-59. For further discussion, see infra notes 89-234 and accompanying
text. Recently, the Court has stated that whether a claim is incident to service is a fact-based
question which must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 57. The lower
federal courts have invented many different tests to determine whether the injury arose out of, or
was in the course of, activity that was incident to service. See 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 155.02 (1988); Annotation, Serviceman's
Right to Recover Under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.), 31 A.L.R. Fed. 146
(1977); see also infra note 99 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
14. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
15. 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
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should clear up the confusion in the lower federal courts and, thereby,
help to moderate the amount of litigation in this area.1" Unfortunately,
because the decision completely ignored the military discipline analysis
used in Shearer II and failed to address the incident to service ques-
tion, Johnson III only adds to the confusion in the lower courts. More-
over, Johnson III is a narrow decision which only should affect a small
category of cases.17 Johnson III will not affect the incident to service
tests because the Court stated conclusively, without discussion, that the
plaintiff was acting incident to service.18 Furthermore, although John-
son III silently repudiates the military discipline analysis, it does not
overrule Shearer II. The lower courts, therefore, still should use this
military discipline analysis on a case-by-case basis in order to deter-
mine what is incident to service in all factual situations not already
barred by Feres.9
Thus, until the Supreme Court clearly and consistently defines in-
cident to service and confines its analysis to this definition, confusion in
the lower federal courts will continue. The current analyses and ratio-
nales proffered for the Feres doctrine are so nebulous that they lead to
result-oriented decisions.20 Part II of this note traces the historical de-
16. See Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 20, col. 1.
17. Not only is Johnson III a 5-4 decision with a strong dissent but its application is narrow,
affecting only servicemembers' suits against civilian government employees who play an integral
role in military activities.
18. The Supreme Court opinion in Johnson III merely stated that Johnson's injury arose out
of a military mission and, therefore, was incident to service. Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2069. The
Court stated that the military discipline rationale is "inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
[a] military mission." Id. The Court noted that the status of the tortfeasor is unimportant, id. at
2066, and only mentioned the civilian tortfeasor's role in a footnote, id. at 2069 n.11.
19. As long as Feres is the law, certain categories of cases will be automatically denied recov-
ery. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. These categories of cases, such as the medical
malpractice cases, have already been deemed incident to service because if generally permitted,
these claims supposedly would affect military discipline. See infra notes 185; and 208-09 and ac-
companying text. Yet, because Shearer II used the military discipline analysis in a factual situa-
tion which did not fit into one of these categories, the lower courts also should do so. In other
words, because Shearer II stated that neither the duty status nor the location of the injury was
determinative, Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 57, the lower courts should not deny recovery merely be-
cause the servicemember was injured while on base or on duty. If the case does not fall within a
category of cases specifically barred by Feres, then the court should deny recovery only when the
case is of the type that "if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military
affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." Id. at 59. For example, in the lower
court opinion of Johnson (Johnson I), the Eleventh Circuit applied the military discipline analysis
because there had never been a Feres case against civilian government employees in which recov-
ery had been denied. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in John-
son III denied recovery by extending the Feres doctrine to bar claims against civilian employees
intimately involved in military affairs. Thus, Johnson III created another category of cases which
will be denied recovery. Yet, because Feres cases are fact specific, the military discipline analysis
should still be viable in many cases.
20. In fact, in recent years, the Court has only been consistent in expanding the Feres doc-
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velopment of the rationales for the Feres doctrine. Part III discusses
the Supreme Court's failure to define incident to service and the lower
federal courts' attempts to deal with this failure. After analyzing
Shearer 11 and Johnson III and some of their progeny, Part IV argues
that the Supreme Court has manipulated the Feres rationales and the
definitions of incident to service in order to maintain the government's
immunity from servicemember's claims. Part V discusses the future im-
pact of Johnson III by contemplating which types of claims still may
warrant recovery. Finally, part VI concludes that Johnson III merely
added another category of cases to be barred by Feres and thus limited
the use of Shearer 11's military discipline analysis to factual situations
not barred already by Feres. The lower federal courts, therefore, should
not overreact to Johnson III's reaffirmance of Feres by denying recov-
ery summarily in all Feres cases.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALES FOR THE FERES
DOcTRINE-THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
Numerous courts and commentators have traced thoroughly the
historical development of the Supreme Court's rationales for the Feres
doctrine.21 The purpose of this section, therefore, is simply to give the
background necessary to understand the current status of the doctrine.
A. Brooks v. United States
The Supreme Court first considered the question of whether ser-
vicemembers could recover under the FTCA in Brooks v. United
States.2 In Brooks two servicemembers were driving along a public
highway when their car was hit by an army truck driven by a civilian
employee.23 In holding that the servicemembers could recover, the
trine in order to deny recovery. The inconsistent rationales and analyses used to arrive at this
result have made the Feres cases another example of what happens when the Supreme Court fo-
cuses on the result of the case rather than on defining and confining itself to a logical analysis.
Until the Supreme Court more clearly defines incident to service and applies the rationales of
Feres more consistently to this definition, the seemingly endless litigation will continue until Feres
is overruled.
21. For a more thorough discussion of the development of the rationales for the Feres doc-
trine, see Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2070-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bennett, supra note 9, at 385-
88, 400-406; Bernott, supra note 9, at 52-54. See generally Note, Military Medical Malpractice
and the Feres Doctrine, 20 GEo. L. REv. 497 (1986); Note, Government Liability for Personal
Injuries to Military Personnel, 51 J. Am L. & Cox 1087 (1986); Note, From Feres to Stencel,
supra note 9; Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine, supra note 9; Feres Holding Lives, supra
note 8, at 20-21, col. 1.
22. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). For a thorough annotation and analysis of Feres cases, see generally 1
L. JAYSON, supra note 12, §§ 75-108.
23. 377 U.S. at 50.
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Court stated that the statute's terms were clear.2 4 The statute provided
for federal district court jurisdiction over "any claim founded on negli-
gence brought against the United States."2
The Court went on to explain that, although the FTCA contained
twelve exceptions to its general waiver of immunity, none of the excep-
tions precluded the servicemembers' claim.2" The only exception specif-
ically involving servicemembers excluded claims arising out of wartime
activities of the military or Coast Guard. Because of these lengthy and
specific exceptions, the Brooks Court concluded that Congress did not
mean to except the noncombat claims of servicemembers, but rather
intended to include servicemembers' claims in the term "any claim."28
In fact the Court considered it absurd to believe that Congress did not
have servicemembers in mind when the FTCA was passed in 1946.29
Although the Government contemplated "dire consequences" if ser-
vicemembers were allowed recovery, the Court held that the Brooks'
accident had nothing to do with their army careers, except in the sense
that "all human events depend upon what has already transpired."30
The Court, however, stated that if the Brooks' accident had been inci-
dent to service, a completely different case would have been
presented."1 That completely different case came to the Court one year
later in Feres v. United States.2
24. Id. at 51. The fact that the servicemembers were in the Armed Forces at the time of the
accident did not prevent them from recovering. Id.
25. Id. The court stated that it was "not persuaded that 'any claim' mean[t] 'any claim but
that of servicemen.'" Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Additionally, the Court found the fact that the Brooks were receiving veteran's bene-
fits to be irrelevant. Id. at 53. The Court explained that neither the FTCA nor the veteran's laws
provided for exclusiveness of remedies. Moreover, the veteran's benefits simply could be deducted
when the servicemember obtained judgment under the FTCA. Id.
30. Id. at 52. By "dire consequences" the Government probably meant the effect of civilian
courts inquiry into military affairs, the effects of large claims against the government, and the
endless litigation that would occur if servicemembers' suits were allowed.
31. Id. In regard to incident to service claims the Court states:
The Government's fears may have point [sic] in reflecting congressional purpose to leave inju-
ries incident to service where they were, despite literal language and other considerations to
the contrary. The result may be so outlandish that even the factors we have mentioned would
not permit recovery. But that is not the case before us.
Id. at 53.
32. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Two companion cases, both involving malpractice claims, were de-
cided with Feres. In Jefferson v. United States, the plaintiff had abdominal surgery while in the
army. About eight months after the plaintiff was discharged, a towel 30 inches long and 18 inches
wide and marked "U.S. Army" was discovered and removed from his stomach. In United States v.
Griggs, the executrix alleged that the servicemember, while on active duty, died from negligent
medical treatment by Army surgeons. In both of these cases the Court found that these malprac-
tice claims were incident to service and, therefore, denied recovery. Id. at 137.
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B. Feres v. United States
In Feres a servicemember burned to death when the barracks that
he was sleeping in caught fire. His executrix claimed that the Govern-
ment had been negligent in allowing servicemembers to live in barracks
that the Government had known to be unsafe. The Court explained
that the FTCA should be construed as being part of a framework of
statutory remedies against the Government.3 The Court stated that the
primary purpose of the Act was to simply provide a remedy to those
persons who had been without one.34 The Court added that while the
Act grants jurisdiction to the district courts over all claims, it does not
provide that all claims are recognizable in law. 5 The Feres Court put
forth three rationales for determining when claims incident to service
are not recognizable in law: the "parallel private liability" rationale, the
"distinctively federal" rationale, and the "uniform compensation"
rationale.3 6
1. The Parallel Private Liability Rationale
The first rationale advanced by the Feres Court for refusing to al-
low servicemembers to recover under the FTCA for injuries that arise
out of activity incident to service was that parallel private liability re-
quired by the FTCA was absent.37 The Act states that the United
States shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a
similarly situated private individual.3 8 The Court, therefore, reasoned
that the Act did not create new causes of action, it merely made availa-
ble those afforded to private litigants.3 9 The Court stated that there was
no private counterpart to an incident to service claim against the
33. Id. at 139. The Court stated that the common fact in Feres and its companion cases was
that each claimant, while on active duty, sustained injury due to the negligence of other service-
members. Id. at 138. Before the Feres Court began its statutory construction of the FTCA, it
recognized that Congress "possesse[d] a ready remedy" if it misinterpreted the statute. Id. Despite
the fact that the FTCA contemplated suits from military personnel and that the express excep-
tions did not exclude noncombat claims, id., the Feres Court precluded recovery for its own rea-
sons. Because the FTCA does not exclude either expressly or impliedly incident to service claims,
the Court wrote its own exception to the Act and denied recovery because of the dire consequences
that would befall the Government if recovery were allowed. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53.
34. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140. Before Congress waived immunity in the FTCA, relief often was
sought through private bills in Congress. The volume of these private bills, and Congress' inability
to deal with them, led to the transfer of the burden of examining tort claims to the courts. Few
private bills were on behalf of military personnel because a comprehensive statutory system of
relief already had been authorized for them and their dependents. Id.
35. Id. at 140-41.
36. Id. at 141-44.
37. Id. at 140-41.
38. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
39. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
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United States.4" The Court, therefore, reasoned that incident to service
claims do not present liability under "like circumstances" because no
private individual can exercise such authority over individuals as the
Government exercises over servicemembers. 41 No pajallel liability ex-
isted for incident to service claims before the enactment of the FTCA;
the Court, therefore, found that no liability existed after its
enactment.42
The Supreme Court subsequently rejected this private liability ra-
tionale in Indian Towing Co. v. United States." In Indian Towing the
Court concluded that the Government could be found liable under the
FTCA even though there was no parallel private liability for the Coast
Guards' negligent operation of a lighthouse." The Court held that the
Act did not exclude liability for the negligent performance of "uniquely
45governmental" activity because all government activity was unique.
Two years after Indian Towing in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,4' the
Court imposed liability on the Government for the negligence of its
firefighters.47 The Rayonier Court stated that although such liability
may be "novel and unprecedented, '48 the very purpose of the FTCA
was to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability.
49
The Indian Towing Court also rejected the dire consequences50 ra-
tionale alluded to in Brooks by stating that the FTCA can subject the
Government to great liability, and the Court should refrain from giving
back the very immunity the statute took away.51 The Court in Rayonier
reasoned that Congress had considered exposing the Government to lia-
bility and had decided it was appropriate.5 2 Consequently, the Court
40. Id.
41. Id. at 141-42. The Court recognized that if they ignored the status of both the wronged
and the wrongdoer in these cases they would find analogous private liability. For example, in civil-
ian doctor-patient relationships there is liability for malpractice. The liability assumed by the Gov-
ernment under the FTCA, however, is created by all of the circumstances. Id. at 142.
42. Id.
43. 350 U.S. 61 (1955); see sources cited supra note 21 (containing analysis of the rejection of
the private liability rationale in Indian Towing).
44. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
45. Id. at 67. The Court stated that all Government activity inherently is unique because it is
performed by the Government. The language of the FTCA, therefore, does not support the "paral-
lel private liability" rationale because the very purpose of the statute is to compensate victims
injured by the negligent conduct of governmental affairs. Id. at 68.
46. 352 U.S. 315 (1957); see sources cited supra note 21.
47. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319.
48. Id.
49. Id. This holding is in direct conflict with the Feres Court which stated: "[The FTCA's]
effect is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action and [is] not to visit the Government
with novel and unprecedented liabilities." Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
51. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
52. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 320. The Court stated that:
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was unjustified in creating exceptions to the Act.53 Since the Feres deci-
sion the Supreme Court has abandoned the parallel private liability
rationale.5
2. The Distinctively Federal Rationale
The FTCA provides that the local law of the place where the act or
omission occurred will govern any consequent liability.5 Because this
local law provision assimilates the divergent laws of the states into fed-
eral law, the Feres Court believed that it would be unfair to apply it to
the servicemember who was not free to choose the state into which mili-
tary service placed him."" The Court added that it would make no sense
for the geography of an injury to determine the law to be applied to a
servicemember's tort claim because the relationship between the Gov-
ernment and servicemembers is distinctively federal in character.6 7
Thirteen years later, however, the Court abandoned this distinc-
tively federal rationale in United States v. Muniz.5 8 In Muniz the
Court allowed federal prisoners to sue the Government for personal in-
juries sustained while in federal prison through the negligence of gov-
ernment employees. 9 The Court abandoned the distinctively federal
rationale60 by allowing prisoners, "who have no more control over their
geographical location than do service[members], to recover under the
FTCA."' l The Court reasoned that, while a nonuniform right to recover
would be prejudicial to prisoners, no recovery would be even more
Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are charged against the public
treasury they are in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the support of
the Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the
entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed.
Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a
whole benefits from the services performed by Government employees.
Id.
53. Id. Of course, the Feres Court created the Feres doctrine by reading exceptions into the
Act. Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 20, col. 2.
54. Recently, in Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 n.5 (1988), the Court once
again rejected the viability of the "parallel private liability" rationale. Id.
55. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
56. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43.
57. Id. at 143. The Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing for those
disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent upon geographic considerations
over which they have no control and to laws which fluctuate in existence and value." Id. The Court
in Feres went on to quote the opinion in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947),
which stated: "[T]he scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation between per-
sons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed
by federal authority." Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 305-06, quoted in Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44.
58. 374 U.S. 150 (1963); see sources cited supra note 21.
59. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 150.
60. Id. at 161.
61. United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2071-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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prejudicial.6 2
3. The Uniform Compensation Rationale
The third rationale advanced by the Feres Court for denying ser-
vicemembers' recovery against the Government for incident to service
claims was that the FTCA failed to adjust veteran's benefits for recov-
ery under the Act. 3 The Court, therefore, stated that the statute must
have intended veteran's benefits to be the exclusive remedy for ser-
vicemembers. The Court reasoned that the servicemember was better
off with the assured benefits than with the possibility of no recovery
through litigation under the FTCA, especially because the soldier was
at a disadvantage in litigation. 4 Moreover, the Court believed that the
Veteran's Benefits Act provided adequate compensation and compared
very favorably with benefits provided by similar statutes.6 5
The uniform compensation rationale has never been a strong justi-
fication for the Feres doctrine, and it continues to be nondeterminative.
The Court in Brooks stated that provisions in other statutes for disabil-
ity payments to servicemembers cannot be construed to preclude ac-
tions under the FTCA;6 6 and there was nothing in the Act or veteran's
benefits law that provided for the exclusivity or election of remedies.6 7
Moreover, the Brooks Court stated that any problem with adjustment
could be solved by deducting veteran's benefits when the ser-
vicemember obtained a judgment under the FTCA 8 In fact, in United
States v. Brown69 the Supreme Court allowed a servicemember to re-
cover under the FTCA even though his veteran's benefits had been in-
creased because of his injury.70 In Brown a discharged veteran brought
suit under the FTCA for negligent treatment received at a veteran's
administration hospital for an injury that occurred while on active
duty. 7 1 Notwithstanding the fact the injury occurred while on active
duty, the Court found that the claim was not incident to service and
that the veteran's benefits law did not bar recovery under the FTCA.72
62. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 162.
63. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
64. Id. at 145. The Court believed the soldier to be at a disadvantage in litigation because of
the "[l]ack of time and money, [and] the difficulty if not impossibility of procuring witnesses." Id.
65. Id. The Veteran's Benefits Act was similar to state workman compensation statutes. Id.
66. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 348 U.S. 110 (1954); see sources cited supra note 21.
70. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
71. Id. at 110.
72. Id. at 113. For a more thorough discussion of the rejection of this rationale, see Johnson
III, 107 S. Ct. at 2072-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42:233
EXPANSION OF THE FERES DOCTRINE
C. The Military Discipline Rationale
In its decision in Brown the Court proffered a new rationale for the
Feres doctrine. Specifically, the Court stated that the "peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors," the effects of ser-
vicemember suits on discipline, and the "extreme results that might ob-
tain if suits under the [FTCA] were allowed for negligent orders given
or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty" had led the
Feres Court to construe the Act as excluding claims that were incident
to service.73 This military discipline rationale has become the primary
justification for the Feres doctrine.
The other rationales for the Feres doctrine, however, have not been
abandoned completely. In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States, 75 decided in 1977, the Supreme Court reiterated two of the orig-
inal Feres rationales. First, the Court stated that the distinctively fed-
eral relationship between the Government and its armed forces made it
irrational for the Government's liability to depend on the fortuity of
the laws of the state where the injury occurred.7" Additionally, the
Court stated that the Veterans' Benefit Act established a "no fault"
compensation scheme as a substitute for tort liability. However, the
Court also restated the military discipline rationale that was enunciated
in Brown.7 Before Stencel many lower courts and commentators had
questioned the continued viability of Feres when military discipline was
not at stake.78 Yet, after Stencel reaffirmed Feres, the lower courts be-
gan to give more weight to the original Feres rationales and, thereby, to
deny recovery more summarily.7 9
In 1985, however, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Shearer
(Shearer II),80 again stated that the effect of servicemember suits on
military discipline was the most important rationale for Feres8 1 In fact,
the Shearer II Court based its entire decision to deny recovery on the
military discipline rationale,82 which again led lower courts to question
the viability of Feres in situations when the servicemember's suit did
73. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
74. The Muniz Court claimed that the Feres doctrine rests on the military discipline ration-
ale. 374 U.S. at 162. Moreover, the Court in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985),
admitted that the three rationales cited in Feres are "no longer controlling." Id.
75. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
76. Id. at 671.
77. Id.
78. See 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 12, § 155.05, at 5-97 to 5-102.2.
79. See id. at 5-96, 5-97 & n.15.1.
80. 473 U.S. 52. For a discussion of the facts of Shearer II, see infra notes 134-36 and accom-
panying text.
81. Shearer 11, 473 U.S. at 57.
82. Id. at 57-58.
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not affect military discipline. 83
In a complete turnaround two years later, the Court in Johnson
11184 denied recovery by reaffirming the "distinctively federal" and
"uniform compensation" rationales for Feres 5 The reaction of lower
courts and commentators to Johnson III appears to be similar to their
reaction to Stencel8 6 On the whole, the courts have read Johnson III's
reaffirmance of Feres to require that they also apply two of the original
rationales for Feres and thus deny recovery more summarily.8 7 This
Note contends that the lower courts have overreacted to Johnson III.
The lower federal courts should not deny recovery automatically be-
cause Johnson III reaffirmed Feres, but rather should continue to apply
Shearer II's military discipline analysis in all factual situations not
barred already by Feres8
III. INCIDENT TO SERVIcE: THE SUPREME COURT'S LACK OF DEFINITION
IS THE REAL DILEMMA
The Court's vacillation in determining which rationales are deter-
minative for the explication of the Feres doctrine has engendered con-
siderable confusion among lower courts. The lower courts have been
called upon to apply Feres to a myriad of factual situations. With little
guidance or commentary from the Court, the lower courts have estab-
lished their own guidelines for applying Feres. While the Feres Court
held that the Government is not liable under the FTCA for injuries to
servicemembers when the injuries arise out of activity considered to be
incident to service,89 the Supreme Court has failed to define the term
incident to service.90 Consequently, the only way to determine what ac-
tivities will be considered incident to service is to look at what activities
the Court has deemed to be incident to service. In Brooks, for example,
the Court found that the servicemembers' injury was not incurred inci-
dent to service. The Brooks Court stated that the servicemembers' acci-
dent had nothing to do with their army careers; the servicemembers
83. See Atkinson v. United States, 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986) (Atkinson 1); Johnson v.
United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson 1).
84. 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987). See text accompanying note 107 for a discussion of the facts to
Johnson III.
85. Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
86. See 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 12, § 155.05, at 5-96, 5-97 & n.15.1; see also Atkinson v.
United States, 825 F.2d 202, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1987) (Atkinson II); Feres Doctrine Remains
Stronger Than Ever, Nat'l L.J., June 1, 1987, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter Doctrine Remains]; Feres
Holding Lives, supra note 8.
87. See Atkinson I, 804 F.2d at 561.
88. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
89. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
90. See supra note 7.
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were on furlough and driving off-base when they were hit by an army
truck.91 Their injuries were not caused by their army service "except in
the sense that all human events depend upon what has already tran-
spired. '9 2 The Brooks Court, therefore, held that an injury sustained to
servicemembers while off-base and on furlough is not incident to
service.
In Feres the Court found the servicemembers' medical malpractice
and negligent maintenance claims to be incident to service. Yet, failing
to explain why these claims were incident to service, the Court merely
stated that each claimant, "while on active duty and not on furlough,
sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces. 93
Consequently, the Feres Court found that an injury sustained to ser-
vicemembers while on active duty and due to the negligence of others in
the armed forces was incident to service.
Alternatively, the Brown Court found that a medical malpractice
claim brought by a discharged servicemember was not incident to ser-
vice. 4 In Brown a discharged veteran brought a damage claim for the
negligent treatment of his knee in a veteran's administration hospital.
The original injury occurred while the servicemember was on active
duty in the armed forces. The negligent treatment of his knee, however,
occurred after his discharge. The Veteran's Administration found his
knee injury to be service-connected and allowed compensation. In al-
lowing recovery, the Court claimed that the medical malpractice claim
was not incident to service because the malpractice injury "was not in-
curred while [the servicemember] was on active duty or subject to mili-
tary discipline." Instead, "[t]he injury occurred after his discharge,
while he enjoyed civilian status."9 5 Brown, therefore, added to the
Brooks' Court definition of what is not incident to service all injuries
sustained while the servicemember is not on active duty and not subject
to military discipline.
In Stencel a servicemember was injured while flying a military air-
craft when the ejection system of his aircraft malfunctioned during an
emergency. He sued Stencel, the manufacturer of the ejection system,
and the United States. Stencel also sued the United States for indem-
nity. The Court found that the injury was incident to service and,
therefore, denied recovery for the indemnity action. The Court's only
91. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
92. Id. at 52.
93. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138; see also supra note 32.
94. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
95. Id. at 112.
96. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 668.
97. Id. at 673-74.
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statement concerning the term incident to service was that an "on-duty
serviceman who is injured due to the negligence of Government officials
may not recover against the United States."98 The Court simply pre-
sumed-perhaps by inference from factors in Brooks and Brown-that
servicemembers on active duty and not on furlough fell within the inci-
dent to service exception.
Thus, the Supreme Court has not given much guidance in deter-
mining what type of injury will be considered incident to service.
Clearly, an injury sustained by a servicemember who is on duty, not on
furlough, and subject to military discipline at the time of his injury is
considered to be incident to service. Conversely, a servicemember who
is injured while on furlough, off-base, and not subject to military disci-
pline would not be considered incident to service. Consistent with these
Supreme Court decisions, the lower federal courts have created bright-
line tests based on factors including duty status, subjection to military
discipline, and the location of the injury, in order to determine which
injuries would be considered incident to service.99
Much of the developments in the lower courts became questioned,
however, after the Supreme Court's opinion in Shearer 11.100 In Shearer
the servicemember was off-duty and off-base when he was murdered by
a fellow servicemember. Private Shearer's mother brought suit against
98. Id. at 669.
99. Generally, the lower courts have looked at four factors to determine whether the claim
arose incident to service. The factors are: (1) "the place where the negligent act occurred," (2) "the
duty status of the plaintiff when the negligent act occurred," (3) "benefits accruing to plaintiff
because of his status as a service member," and (4) "the nature of the plaintiff's activities at the
time the negligent act occurred." 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 12, § 155.07[3][i], at 5-118.2. While all of
these factors are important, none of them is dispositive. Id. For example, the location of the acci-
dent is only one factor to be considered. Id. If the injury occurs on-base it is more likely that the
injured servicemember was engaged in an activity incident to service. Id. But the occurrence of an
on-base injury does not trigger Feres automatically. Id. If the injury occurred on-base the court
will inquire into the nature of the servicemember's activity at the time of injury in order to ascer-
tain the "totality of the circumstances." Id. § 155.07[1][g], at 5-109. Probably the most important
factor in the incident to service determination is the duty status of the servicemember plaintiff.
See id. § 155.02, at 5-78.
Apart from these four factors, a common rationale for barring recovery in medical malpractice
and recreational cases is the "privileged activity" test. According to this test, "if the accident oc-
curs while the service[member] is [on-base] or on board a military aircraft, even though he may be
in an off-duty status, the claim has generally been regarded as incident to service." Id. § 155.02, at
5-82.3. One reason for finding these claims to be incident to service is that the servicemember is on
military premises simply because of his military status. Consequently, there is a direct relationship
between the injury and his military status. Id. § 155.02, at 5-82.6 to 5-82.7. Moreover, while on the
military premises the servicemember is presumed to be under immediate military control and dis-
cipline. Id. at 5-82.7. Thus, if the soldier is injured while taking advantage of military privileges
generally restricted to the military, he will be barred by Feres. Id. See Note, The Federal Tort
Claims Act: A Cause of Action for Servicemen, 14 VAL. U. L. REv. 527, 558-61 (1980). See gener-
ally 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 12, §§ 155.08[2][a] to [2][b], 155.08[3][a] to [3][h].
100. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
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the United States claiming that while the Army knew that the ser-
vicemember who murdered Shearer was dangerous, it negligently failed
to control him and failed to warn others of the danger. 1°1 The Third
Circuit in Shearer I, relying on Brooks, held that the injury was not
incident to service, and the Supreme Court reversed. 102 In Shearer I the
Third Circuit allowed recovery because servicemembers who are off-
duty, off-base, and engaged in nonmilitary activity at the time of injury
generally have been allowed to recover. 103 After stating that Feres is
based predominantly on the military discipline rationale, the Supreme
Court reversed and denied recovery. The Court stated that Feres "can-
not be reduced to a few bright-line rules," but rather "each case must
be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres
and subsequent cases."' 0'4 Shearer II stated that the location of the
murder was not as important as whether the claim would require the
judiciary to question military decisions. 10 5 According to the Court,
Shearer's complaint struck at the core of the concerns involving mili-
tary discipline by "call[ing] into question the basic choices about the
discipline, supervision, and control of a service[member]."' 6
Thus, in order to deny recovery, the Supreme Court in Shearer I
abandoned the factors deemed relevant in Brooks and Brown and intro-
duced an unprecedented case-by-case analysis of the suit's effect on
military discipline. After Shearer II, neither the location of the injury
nor the activity of the servicemember appeared to weigh too heavily in
the determination of what was considered to be incident to service. In-
stead, the question of whether the claim endangered military discipline
and effectiveness was determinative; if military discipline was involved,
then the claim was considered incident to service.
IV. THE CURRENT DILEMMA: MANIPULATION OF THE RATIONALES FOR
Feres IN ORDER TO DEFINE INCIDENT TO SERVICE
A. The Lower Federal Courts' Attempts to Allow Recovery
Because the Court has failed to articulate a clear definition of what
is to be considered incident to service, the Feres doctrine has generated
a great deal of case law. Ultimately, the lower courts have decided the
cases on the particular facts raised. With every new factual situation,
therefore, there is more litigation.' Moreover, the perceived harshness
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id. at 58-59.
103. Id. This analysis was consistent with the Court's opinion in Brooks.
104. Id. at 57.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 58.
107. There are however several categories of suits that are barred by the Feres doctrine re-
1989] 247
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:233
of the Feres doctrine by the lower courts, 08 as well as the erosion of the
rationales for Feres, have led to newly evolving doctrines in order to
ease the bar created by Feres.
1. The Eleventh Circuit Panel Opinion of Johnson v. United States
(Johnson I)
One case that employed a new doctrine to ease the Feres bar is
Johnson v. United States (Johnson 1).109 In Johnson I the Eleventh
Circuit accepted an innovative argument in order to allow recovery. In
this case the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) gave negligent ra-
dar information to a coast guard helicopter pilot on a rescue mission,
causing him to fly into the side of a mountain which resulted in his
death."0 The Johnson I court recognized that the "single most impor-
tant, and defensible, rationale" for Feres was the military discipline ra-
tionale first mentioned in Brown."' The court refused to focus on
whether Johnson's injury was incident to service because the "Feres
factual paradigm""' was not present." 3 If the tortfeasor was not a
member of the armed forces or a civilian employee engaged in activities
usually associated with the armed forces, the court concluded that it
should examine the Feres rationales restated in Stencel to determine
whether allowing the claim would frustrate the purposes of the
FTCA. 114 The Johnson I court stated that the Supreme Court, in those
gardless of the particular facts in each individual case. Derivative tort cases, including the Agent
Orange cases which involve the families of servicemembers who bring their own claims because
they were injured through the Government's negligence towards their servicemember relative, have
been barred by Feres. See generally Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982); Bennett, supra note 9, at 393-400. Suits against servicemembers as individuals
also are barred by Feres. See United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296 (1983). Most medical malpractice claims and recreational claims are barred by Feres
under the privileged activity test. See supra note 99. Finally, after Johnson III it appears that
claims brought by servicemembers injured while on a military mission will be categorically barred
by Feres.
108. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
109. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 1531.
111. Id. at 1533, 1537-38.
112. Id. at 1537. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the "Feres factual paradigm" consists of
a suit for injuries or death allegedly caused by the negligence of a servicemember or an employee
of the armed services. The court claimed that it had developed this analysis from studying Feres
and its progeny, including Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980). Johnson I, 749
F.2d at 1537.
113. Johnson I, 749 F.2d at 1537. The court stated that the issue was whether the injury
arose out of, or during the course of, an activity incident to service only when the "Feres factual
paradigm" was present. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Stencel, 431 U.S. at 670).
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situations not fitting into the Feres factual paradigm, had applied the
doctrine's rationales to the facts in order to determine if immunizing
the Government from liability was justified.115 Employing this analysis,
the court held that the Feres doctrine did not bar the plaintiff's
claim.1 6
The court based its decision, however, on the military discipline
rationale, 117 stating that this "much maligned doctrine" most accurately
was explained by the desire to avoid civilian court inquiry into matters
that the Supreme Court viewed beyond judicial scrutiny."" The court
recognized that the "common thread" running through Feres cases is
the reluctance to disturb the sensitive relationships that must exist if
the military system is to function properly." 9 The Johnson I court be-
lieved that these delicate military relationships were not jeopardized
under the facts presented. In fact, the court stated that there was no
possibility that the conduct of any tortfeasor, "even remotely connected
to the military, [would] be scrutinized if this case [went] to trial." 0
Thus, the court stated that because the plaintiff's claim could not en-
danger the military disciplinary structure, it would not intrude upon
the military discipline rationale, which serves as the primary justifica-
tion for the Feres doctrine. 121
The Johnson I court noted that the Ninth Circuit had reached the
opposite conclusion in a case involving a similar factual situation. 22
115. Id. at 1538. The court claimed that the Supreme Court used this analysis in Chappell,
Stencel, and Muniz. Id. Additionally, the court stated that its decision to employ this approach
was buttressed by the decision in Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court
stated that the "Hunt court resisted the temptation to automatically extend the Feres bar to a
factual situation not akin to the Feres factual paradigm." Johnson I, 749 F.2d at 1538.
116. Johnson I, 749 F.2d at 1538.
117. The court claimed that it was following Stencel and applying all the rationales for Feres
to this factual situation, but it really only applied the military discipline rationale. See id. at 1537-
38.
118. Id. at 1538. The court cited Stencel and Brown for this proposition, stating that:
"Stencel disallowed third-party indemnity claims against the United States arising out of service-
connected injuries to soldiers, in part because '[t]he trial[s] would . . . involve second-guessing
military orders, and would often require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to
each other's decisions and actions.'" Id. (quoting Stencel, 531 U.S. at 673). The court also stated
that "the Brown Court expressed its concern over the effect intramilitary litigation might have on
discipline, particularly when the suit involved 'negligent orders given or negligent acts committed
in the course of military duty.'" Id. (quoting Brown, 348 U.S. at 112).
119. Id. at 1539.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044
(1980). The Johnson I court noted "that the Supreme Court ha[d] never limited the application of
the Feres doctrine to situations involving a threat to military discipline." Johnson I, 749 F.2d at
1539 (quoting Uptegrove). Moreover, the court stated that "the focus in a Feres case should be
solely on the servicemember's military status, not the status of the tortfeasor." Id. The Johnson I
court simply stated that Uptegrove was decided incorrectly. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The court, however, defended its analysis by stating that in all of the
Supreme Court's Feres cases the tortfeasors were servicemembers or
military employees, and not civilian employees of the government.12
The court, therefore, argued that while disregarding this distinction and
mindlessly applying the Feres bar to a fact situation not contemplated
by the Feres Court has "'the virtue of easy application, [but it is not]
the better jurisprudential course.' ,,124 The court further stated that the
Ninth Circuit displayed a misunderstanding of the military discipline
rationale when it claimed that a threat to military discipline need not
be present in order for Feres to apply.125 The Johnson I court stated
that by definition incident to service claims within the Feres factual
paradigm implicate the military discipline rationale.'26 Moreover, the
post-Brown Supreme Court cases have relied predominantly on the mil-
itary discipline rationale.12
7
The Johnson I court realized that, despite the great criticism of the
Feres doctrine and its competing theoretical underpinnings, it is the
law. 128 Yet, because the court disliked 129 the doctrine and wanted to
allow recovery, it created a new avenue of recovery in its Feres factual
paradigm distinction. The court stated that the Government should not
be awarded "judicially-created immunity from suit" in fact situations
not considered by the Feres Court.130 The court believed that the fact
that Johnson was killed while on a military mission was not control-
ling.13 Thus, rather than follow what has typically been defined as inci-
dent to service-that is, an on-duty servicemember performing a
military mission-the court used the military discipline rationale to de-
123. Johnson I, 749 F.2d at 1540.
124. Id. (citing Brown, 739 F.2d at 366 (quoting Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 493
(8th Cir. 1981) (en banc))).
125. Id.
126. Id. For support of its position the court stated that the Supreme Court "has found it
unseemly to have military personnel injured 'incident to service,' asserting claims that question the
propriety of decisions or conduct by fellow members of the military." Id. (quoting Hunt, 636 F.2d
at 599).
127. Id. The court cited Chappell, Stencel, and Muniz. The court also stated that the status
of the tortfeasor may not need to be examined when the "Feres factual paradigm" is present, but
that the status of the tortfeasor must be examined when the "Feres factual paradigm" is not pre-
sent and the facts permit the court to decide whether to imply an exception to the FTCA. Id. The
court implied that the status of the tortfeasor always should be examined, stating that the Feres
Court supported this implication when it discussed analogous private liability and cautioned
against ignoring the status of the wrongdoer. Id.
128. Id.
129. The court showed its dislike for Feres by stating that "[tihere is no justification for this
court to read exemptions into the [FTCA] beyond those provided by Congress. If the [FTCA] is to
be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted it." Id. (quoting Muniz, 374 U.S. at
166).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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fine what is incident to service. In so doing, the Johnson I court con-
cluded that because the military discipline rationale would not be
implicated by allowing Johnson's suit, the Feres doctrine did not
apply. 132
2. The Third Circuit Opinion of Shearer v. United States
(Shearer 1)
The Third Circuit in Shearer v. United States (Shearer I)133 took
a contrary approach to that of the Eleventh Circuit and applied a total-
ity of circumstances test that relied on the status of the claimant in
order to allow recovery. In Shearer I the servicemember was on-leave
and off-base when he was murdered by another servicemember, Private
Heard. Heard had been convicted of murder in Germany and had been
released from prison only four months before he killed Private
Shearer.1 34 At the time of Shearer's kidnapping and murder, the Army
was aware of Heard's violent record but had ignored the recommenda-
tions of Heard's superiors who had urged his discharge. 35 Shearer's
mother sued the Army for its negligent failure to discharge Heard, its
failure to warn other servicemembers of Heard's violent character, and
its failure to restrain him.1"'
The Third Circuit, as the Eleventh Circuit had in Johnson I, stated
that the main rationale for Feres was the military discipline ration-
ale.1 3 7 The court, however, did not use the military discipline rationale
in order to define incident to service. 1 3  Rather, the court stated that
because the question of whether an injury is sustained incident to ser-
vice is fact-based, a court must look at ihe specific facts of each situa-
132. Id. Although the basic approach of using the military discipline rationale to determine
what is incident to service is the same approach the Supreme Court would use in Shearer II, the
Eleventh Circuit, in an attempt to allow recovery, incorrectly found that military discipline would
not be implicated. First, because Johnson was on a military mission at the time of his accident it is
likely that some military orders would be called into question. Additionally, suits against civilians
who play an integral role in military affairs, including the FAA, easily could affect military disci-
pline. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
133. 723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); see also Third Circuit Review,
Shearer v. United States, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1017 (1984); Strutin, Feres is Narrowed: GI's Mother
Sues Army, PA. L.J. REP., Jan. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
134. Heard had been prosecuted in Germany and sentenced to four years in prison for the
grotesque murder of a German woman. He allegedly murdered the woman by inflicting head inju-
ries with a wrench and a lifting jack after engaging in forced sexual activity. Shearer I, 723 F.2d at
1104.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1105.
137. Id. Thus, "Feres insulate[d] the military from FTCA suits arising out of 'negligent or-
ders given or negligent acts committed in the course of' an injured service[member's] military
duty." Id. (quoting Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671).
138. Id.
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tion in order to determine if the injury or death was sustained "in the
course of" military service.13 9 Consequently, the court stated that the
focal point of the Feres doctrine is the relationship between the ser-
vicemember and the military at the time and place of the injury."" The
court claimed that the status and activity of the servicemember at the
time of injury are the dominant factors.""
The court applied the traditional test for determining what is inci-
dent to service by taking into account: "(1) [t]he status of the injured
soldier at the time of injury, (2) the place of the injury, (3) the nature
of the activity engaged in, and (4) whether the injured party was acting
under orders or compulsion.' 1 42 The court generally stated that an in-
jury sustained by a servicemember who is off-duty, off-base, and not
involved in military activity at the time of injury is deemed not incident
to service and, therefore, allowed to recover. 43
At the time of his murder, Shearer was not involved in any military
activity.144 On the contrary, Shearer was off-duty and off-base in an-
other state when he was kidnapped and murdered. 45 The court stated
that the district court's error in denying recovery resulted from its focus
on the status and activity of the tortfeasor rather than the status and
activity of the claimant. 146 Thus, the Shearer I court, unlike the court
in Johnson I, focused on the status of the claimant and defined inci-
dent to service as it had been defined traditionally. In other words, the
Shearer I court applied the totality of circumstances test, rather than
asking merely whether the military discipline rationale had been impli-
cated. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court, in order to deny recov-
ery, used the same approach employed by the Eleventh Circuit in
Johnson L
B. The Supreme Court's Denial of Recovery
1. The Supreme Court Opinion of United States v. Shearer
(Shearer Ii)
The Supreme Court in United States v. Shearer (Shearer II)1 47
stated that, although Feres was based on several grounds, it was ex-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Brown, 348 U.S. at 112; Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; and Jaffee v. United States,
663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3d Cir. 1981)).
143. Id. at 1106.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
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plained best by the military discipline rationale. 148 Denying recovery,
the Shearer II Court introduced an unprecedented case-by-case meth-
odology. ' 9 The Court stated that Feres could not be limited to a few
bright-line rules.150 Instead, the Court stated that every case must be
analyzed in regard to the FTCA as it has been interpreted in Feres and
subsequent cases.15' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
fact that Shearer was on-leave and off-base at the time of his murder to
be controlling. 152 The Supreme Court noted, however, that the location
of the murder was not as important as whether the suit would cause the
judiciary to question military decisions.15 Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that a court must not use the traditional off-duty, off-base
factors to determine whether a claim is incident to service, but instead
must use a case-by-case analysis focusing on whether the suit implicates
the military discipline rationale in order to determine if the claim is
incident to service.154 If a court must second-guess military decisions, or
if the suit might impair military discipline, then the injury is incident
to service.15 5 Moreover, the Court brought even more claims into the
incident to service exception by stating that the particular claim before
the court does not have to implicate the military discipline rationale. 156
Instead, the claim merely must be of the type that if generally allowed
would require civilian courts to become involved in military affairs at
the risk of harming military discipline and effectiveness. 57
The Shearer II Court also focused on the status of the
tortfeasors. 5 s The Court stated that Shearer's allegation involved the
"management" of the military by questioning basic decisions about the
control and supervision of a servicemember. ' 9 The Court noted that it
was immaterial that the claim was characterized as a personnel decision
because it was the type of claim that, if generally allowed, would impli-
cate the military discipline rationale. 160 Thus, the Shearer II Court
148. Id. at 57-58 n.4.
149. Id. at 57.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 59.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 59. The tortfeasors were the military commanders who negligently failed to dis-
charge Heard. This focus on the tortfeasor also had been the approach of the Eleventh Circuit in
Johnson L
159. Id. at 58.
160. Id. at 59; see also Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-Government Liability for Personal
Injuries to Military Personnel, 51 J. Am L. & CoM. 1087 (1986).
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seemed to be saying that what mattered in determining what is incident
to service is whether the claim is of the type that, if generally allowed,
would implicate the military discipline rationale.
2. The Lower Courts' Interpretation of Shearer 11
a. The Eleventh Circuit's Rehearing of Johnson v. United States
(Johnson II)
In Johnson 11 the court stated that the Supreme Court opinion in
Shearer 11 reaffirmed the analysis set forth in Johnson v. United States
(Johnson I).161 The Johnson 11 court explained that the Shearer 11
Court based its decision on military discipline and on whether the claim
being considered would cause the judiciary to question military deci-
sions. 162 Following the command of the Shearer II Court to avoid re-
ducing Feres to a few bright-line rules, the Johnson I court analyzed
the case in regard to the FTCA as it has been interpreted by Feres and
subsequent cases.16 3 The court held that the Johnson I opinion gave an
appropriate amount of attention to the Feres rationales, with an em-
phasis on the military discipline rationale. 16
Again, the Johnson 11 court stated that the claims presented in
Johnson I were based entirely upon the activities of the FAA which was
not involved in military affairs.165 Thus, the court found that it cor-
rectly followed the Shearer 11 example by focusing on the status of the
tortfeasor and on whether the military discipline rationale would be im-
plicated. Under the Shearer 11 military discipline analysis duty status
was not dispositive. 16 Thus, the fact that Johnson was killed while on a
military mission for the United States Coast Guard seemed immaterial.
The only relevant consideration was whether military discipline or ef-
fectiveness would be harmed by the suit.
161. 779 F.2d 1492, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987). After the Supreme
Court's decision in Shearer II, the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson H reconsidered its first opinion,
Johnson I, and once again allowed Johnson's widow to recover.
162. Id. at 1493-94.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1494.
165. Id. The Johnson I court, however, incorrectly found that military discipline would not
be affected by these types of claims. See supra note 132.
166. Johnson I, 779 F.2d at 1494. Part V of this Note discusses some other factual situations
in which the Shearer H military discipline analysis can be applied.
[Vol. 42:233
EXPANSION OF THE FERES DOCTRINE
b. The Ninth Circuit Opinion of Atkinson v. United States
(Atkinson I)
In Atkinson v. United States (Atkinson 1)167 the Ninth Circuit,
also relying on Shearer II, allowed a servicemember to recover for the
negligent medical care that she received at an army hospital. Joyce At-
kinson, while serving as a specialist in the Army, received negligent pre-
natal care from military personnel causing her to deliver a stillborn
child. The court began its analysis by recognizing that the Supreme
Court's primary reason for maintaining the Feres doctrine was to pro-
tect military discipline. 68 The Shearer II Court specifically had stated
that the original rationales mentioned in Feres and subsequent cases
were no longer determinative.8 9 The Atkinson I court interpreted this
statement to mean that the Feres doctrine barred suit only when the
judiciary would be required to examine military decisions, or when the
plaintiff's conduct directly implicates the military discipline ration-
ale. 170 Furthermore, the Shearer II Court confirmed that courts should
take a case-by-case approach, rather than a per se approach, to the
Feres doctrine.17 ' The Ninth Circuit, therefore, claimed that it must de-
termine each suit's actual effect on military discipline in order to deter-
mine if barring the claim would serve the intent of the Feres
doctrine. 7 2 When the suit will not jeopardize any important military
interests, the Feres doctrine should not bar recovery.' 73 The Atkinson I
court, following the Shearer II Court's command to examine each case
individually, rejected the per se rule that prohibited medical malprac-
tice claims against the military. 7 4
167. 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988); see also Rouse, Atkin-
son and the Application of the Feres Doctrine in Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Life, and Wrongful
Pregnancy Cases, ARMY LAW., May 1987, at 58; Shemonsky & Flannery, Good-bye Feres Doctrine?
Servicemember Brings Malpractice Action, 15 LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC., June 1987, at 7.
168. Atkinson 1, 804 F.2d at 563 (citing Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 52). The Ninth Circuit stated
that the Supreme Court did not want military personnel who are injured incident to service to
bring suits calling into question the decisions or performance of other servicemembers. Id. (citing
Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Hunt v. United States, 636
F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982)).
169. Atkinson I, 804 F.2d at 563 (citing Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 58 n.4).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Court rejected prior cases that said:
Feres barred a military plaintiff's malpractice claim ... because it would be too difficult to
determine "the effect that a particular type of suit would have upon military discipline. .. "
We reasoned that "[t]his is a classic situation where the drawing of a clear line is more impor-
tant than being able to justify in every conceivable case, the exact point at which it is drawn."
... [W]e refused to determine the effect of a particular malpractice suit on military disci-
pline. . . . [because] "allegations of medical malpractice. . . have consistently been held to
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The court also rejected the totality of circumstances test" 5 as a
"substitute" for determining whether the suit would endanger military
discipline."" Thus, the fact that Atkinson was only able to receive this
medical care because of her military status was insufficient to bar her
suit.'" Her active duty status also was not dispositive. The Atkinson I
court stated that her status was important only if her injury occurred
while she was involved in an activity that relevantly related to her mili-
tary duties." Rather than rely on the duty and status factors, the court
stated that it must determine whether the particular facts in the case
would cause the court to second-guess military decisions, thereby
threatening military discipline and effectiveness.7 9 Using this analysis,
the court allowed Atkinson to recover.
First, the Atkinson I court reasoned that this malpractice claim in-
volved a novel situation in that pregnant servicemembers did not serve
on active duty when Feres was decided in 1950.180 Thus, the Feres
Court, in barring the two companion malpractice claims, could not have
contemplated the unique facts presented in Atkinson I."' The court
failed to see how Atkinson's suit for negligent prenatal care possibly
could endanger military discipline. 182 This factual situation was not the
type of case that would require a civilian court to second-guess military
decisions and, thereby, become involved in military affairs at the ex-
pense of military discipline. 8 3 The Atkinson I court allowed recovery
because it found that there was no connection between Atkinson's med-
ical treatment and military discipline."'8
fall within the bounds of the [Feres] doctrine when the plaintiff was a service[member] on
active duty at the time of the alleged malpractice."
Id. at 563-64 (quoting Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 819 (1973), and Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th. Cir. 1980)).
175. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
176. Atkinson I, 804 F.2d at 564.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. When Atkinson sought medical care she was not on a military mission or subject to
military orders. Moreover, Atkinson was not in a command relationship with her physician. In
addition, the court stated that "the circumstances of this case simply 'do not involve the sort of
close military judgment calls that the Feres doctrine was designed to insulate from judicial re-
view.'" Id. at 565 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1440 (9th Cir. 1983).
183. Id.
184. Id. Malpractice claims are covered by a privileged activity test used by the lower courts.
The court stated that there was absolutely no connection between Atkinson's injuries and her
army career "except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired."
Id. (quoting Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52). This statement is not true, however, because Atkinson would
not have been treated at the military hospital had she not been in the military. As the privileged
activity text, which the court rejects, points out-she would not have been treated by military
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The result in Atkinson I was dictated by, and was a logical exten-
sion of, the Shearer 11 military discipline analysis-Shearer II man-
dated that all Feres cases be re-evaluated in light of the suit's effect on
military discipline. The Supreme Court, however, was fearful of the
lower courts' extension of the Shearer II military discipline analysis, so
the Court ignored Shearer II in deciding United States v. Johnson
(Johnson 111)185 and reaffirmed Feres. The Johnson III Court found
that the injury was incident to service and denied recovery without fo-
cusing on the military discipline rationale.
3. The Supreme Court Decision in Johnson III
In order to deny recovery in Johnson III, the Supreme Court dras-
tically changed the analysis it had used in Shearer II. The Court in
Johnson III did not focus on the status of the tortfeasor, but rather
focused on the status of the claimant.186 In addition, the Johnson III
Court did not use a case-by-case analysis in order to determine whether
military discipline would be impaired if this suit was allowed. Instead,
it denied recovery per se. The Court stated that Johnson's injury arose
incident to service because he was performing a military mission and,
therefore, recovery was denied.8 7 Johnson III simply ignored Shearer
11's case-by-case analysis, and use of the military discipline rationale to
define incident to service, without attempting to explain, justify, or dis-
tinguish it.
The Court reiterated Feres' holding that servicemembers could not
bring suit against the Government for injuries that "'arise out of or are
in the course of activity incident to service.' "188 The Court claimed that
it had never departed from this depiction of the Feres doctrine. 8 9 The
Johnson III Court stated that although all the Feres cases involved
claims of negligent conduct by servicemembers, the Court stated that it
personnel in an army hospital but for her military status. The Atkinson I court, like the Eleventh
Circuit in Johnson I, seemed to stretch the Shearer II military discipline analysis too far. The
basic analyses are the same but these courts did not weigh all of the factors correctly.
185. 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
186. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
187. Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2069. The Court dismissed the incident to service discussion
by saying that there was no dispute that Johnson's injury arose incident to service. Id. The Elev-
enth Circuit dismissed the fact that military missions always have been deemed incident to service
by claiming that only when the Feres factual paradigm is present does the issue of whether the
injury arose out of, or during the course of, an activity incident to service arise. Id. at 2065; see
also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
188. Id. at 2066 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146).
189. Id. The Court has never departed from this general statement because the Court has
managed to achieve its desired result simply by manipulating what type of activities are considered
incident to service.
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had never implied that the tortfeasor's military status was important. 190
Furthermore, the Court specifically noted that the lower courts also had
disregarded the status of the tortfeasor in their application of Feres.'9'
The Johnson III Court refused to alter the doctrine.1 ,2
The Johnson III Court restated the rationales for Feres set forth in
Stencel. First, the Court noted that the relationship between the Gov-
ernment and servicemembers is "'distinctively federal in character.' ,,193
Thus, the liability of the Government should not hinge on the fortuity
of where the negligence occurred. Second, the Court stated that the ex-
istence of veteran's benefits dictated the rejection of servicemembers'
suits for service-incident injuries.9 Finally, incident to service claims
were barred by Feres because they are the "type[s] of claims that, if
generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military af-
fairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."' 95
The Johnson III Court did not overrule the military discipline
analysis used by the Shearer II Court, but it failed to give any guidance
as to the type of factual situation the Shearer II analysis would apply.
The Court did not explain why the Shearer II military discipline analy-
sis could not be used in Johnson III. In order to be consistent, the Su-
preme Court should have applied the military discipline analysis to find
that Johnson's case was of the type that would, if generally permitted,
implicate military discipline. 96 Instead, the fact that the Johnson III
Court ignored Shearer II leads one to believe that the Court was
alarmed at the lower courts' interpretation of Shearer II. By failing to
explain that there may be a difference between civilian tortfeasors who
play an integral role in military affairs and those who do not, the Court
left the impression that the lower federal courts simply should deny
190. Id. The Johnson III Court ignored its implication in Shearer II that the status of the
tortfeasor was important.
191. Id. at 2067 & n.8.
192. Id. at 2067.
193. Id. at 2068 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 143).
194. Id. at 2068-69 (citing Stencel and Shearer II).
195. Id. at 2069 (quoting Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 59 (emphasis in original)).
196. Id. The Court should have emphasized the fact that Johnson's injury was incident to
service because: (1) Johnson went on the mission only because he was in the Coast Guard; (2) his
wife was receiving veteran's benefits because of his death; (3) Johnson was acting pursuant to
standard Coast Guard procedures; and (4) the FAA works very closely with the military. The po-
tential, therefore, that this suit could implicate military discipline was substantial. Instead of ap-
plying the military discipline analysis, the Court merely stated conclusively that the suit must be
denied, regardless of the status of the tortfeasor, because military judgments and decisions inextri-
cably are intertwined with the conduct of the military mission. Id. Although the Court noted that
civilian employees of the government (including the FAA) may play an integral role in military
activities and thus cause an inquiry into the civilian activities to have the same effect on military
discipline as a direct inquiry into military judgments, id. at 2069 n.11, the Court relegated this
discussion to a footnote.
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recovery in every factual situation in which the servicemember is en-
gaged in a military mission regardless of whom the suit is against.197
The Johnson III Court did not overrule Shearer II, however, because
the Court wanted to be able to continue to use the military discipline
rationale to bring even more traditionally non-incident to service claims
under the Feres bar.
Commentators suggest that the Johnson III Court's reaffirmance of
Feres will have a huge impact on the lower courts' attempts to permit
servicemembers to recover. One commentator states that Johnson III
will "slam shut" the door opened by lower courts that allowed ser-
vicemembers' suits against the Government if the suits would not affect
military discipline.198 While Johnson III is "emblematic" of the Su-
preme Court's traditional deference to the military,'99 the decision
should not slam shut any doors. On the contrary, Johnson III should be
read narrowly and have limited impact. It is a five to four decision with
a strong dissent written by Justice Scalia. The dissenters seemed to
want to overrule Feres, but because the respondents did not ask for a
rejection of the doctrine they simply refused to extend Feres. °0 The
dissent admitted that drawing a line between FTCA suits asserting mil-
itary negligence and those asserting civilian negligence was arbitrary.201
Yet Justice Scalia stated that limiting the "unfairness and irrationality"
of Feres is a sufficient reason to draw an arbitrary line confining the
decision.02 By reaffirming Feres the Supreme Court did not eliminate
the use of the Shearer II military discipline analysis, but rather limited
its use to factual situations not barred already by Feres.2 03
The manipulation of the military discipline rationale to define inci-
dent to service in the Supreme Court's opinion of Shearer II and the
lower courts' opinions of Johnson I and Atkinson I testifies to the
197. Because the Johnson III Court said nothing about barring claims against civilians
brought by servicemembers who were not engaged in a military mission at the time of injury or
claims brought against civilian government employees who are not intimately involved with the
military, the lower courts should be able to use the military discipline analysis in these situations.
The Court also did not define "military mission." The Court can broaden Johnson III's holding by
manipulating what is considered to be a military mission.
198. Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21, col. 2.
199. Doctrine Remains, supra note 86, at 5, col. 3.
200. Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2070, 2075 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because "all of the cases
decided by th[e] Court under Feres have involved allegations of negligence on the part of members
of the military," the dissent would not extend Feres to include suits involving negligence on the
part of civilian government employees. Id. at 2075.
201. Id. at 2075.
202. Id. Justice Scalia stated that the Feres decision was wrong. Id. He contended: "[tihere
[was] no justification for [the] Court to read exemptions into the [FTCA] beyond those provided
by Congress." Id.
203. See supra note 19.
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weakness of the Feres doctrine. Although the lower courts and the Su-
preme Court are both guilty of selecting and bending their analyses to
fit their result-oriented opinions,204 the Supreme Court ultimately is re-
sponsible. The Court created the doctrine and then manipulated it to
the point that it virtually can be molded to fit any result that the Court
desires. The lower courts simply are following the Supreme Court's
example.
4. The Lower Courts' Interpretation of Johnson III
a. The Ninth Circuit's Rehearing of Atkinson v. United States (At-
kinson II)
In Atkinson I the Ninth Circuit held that the medical malpractice
claim did not affect military discipline and therefore was not incident
to service.20 5 In Atkinson v. United States (Atkinson 11)206 the Ninth
Circuit reversed its prior decision and made a per se denial of recovery
to the servicemember because it believed that Johnson III "breathe[d]
204. The Court only has used the Shearer H military discipline analysis in order to find an
injury incident to service and thereby to deny recovery. It is unclear whether the Court would use
this analysis in a situation that appeared to be incident to service in order to find that the activity
is not incident to service. Based on the Shearer I opinion, the lower court's analysis in Johnson I
was not so novel. In Shearer I the Court found activity to be incident to service that would not
have been incident to service under the traditional criteria. By manipulating the military discipline
rationale, the Court found a new factor to add to the incident to service analysis. The Eleventh
Circuit used the same type of analysis to allow recovery in Johnson L The Eleventh Circuit stated
that Johnson's death traditionally would be found incident to service, but because the military
rationale was not implicated, he should be able to recover. Shearer II rejected the old analysis.
Both the Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson I and Johnson II, and the Third Circuit, in Shearer I, are
examples of some lower courts' result-oriented approaches in order to allow recovery. As long as
the Supreme Court is inconsistent in its analysis, the lower federal courts will take advantage of
this inconsistency and use the analysis to obtain their desired results.
205. For a discussion of Atkinson I, see supra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
206. 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988). The Eleventh Circuit
heard a similar case in Del Rio v. United States, 833 F.2d 282 (11th Cir. 1987). Servicemember Del
Rio brought an FTCA action against the United States on behalf of herself and her children for
the negligent pre-natal care she received at a navy hospital. Although the court recognized Shearer
H's emphasis on the military discipline rationale, it stated that Johnson III "unequivocally ex-
panded the Feres analysis to include all three rationales." Id. at 285-86. Consequently, the court
applied all three rationales relied on in Johnson III to the facts and found that Ms. Del Rio could
not recover. Id. at 286. Although the Eleventh Circuit stated that her medical treatment was inci-
dent to service because her military status permitted her to receive medical care at the military
hospital, the court read Johnson III too broadly. Id. Rather than stating that a reaffirmance of
Feres unavoidably meant that malpractice claims would be barred because malpractice claims
brought by active servicemembers expressly were barred in the actual Feres case, the court based
its decision on the application of the three rationales to the facts presented. Id. at 287. Ironically,
this approach is not the per se denial of recovery that the commentators had predicted. Instead, it
is a reapplication of the rationales for Feres to this fact situation in order to determine if Feres
applies. While relying on Johnson III, the court really is engaging in a Shearer Il-type, case-by-
case analysis.
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new life into the first two Feres rationales. 20 7 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, overreacted to Johnson III and made the right decision for the
wrong reasons. Although Johnson III mentioned the first two rationales
of Feres, they are not controlling.20 8 These rationales always have been
considered but they are not determinative.
Atkinson, therefore, should not have been denied recovery because
Johnson III reasserted the first two rationales, but rather because her
injury was incurred incident to service. The companion cases to Feres
were malpractice claims brought by active-duty servicemembers. Thus,
as long as Feres is good law, recovery on malpractice claims will be de-
nied, regardless of whether the particular claim before the court impli-
cates military discipline. Feres and its progeny have concluded that
malpractice by army doctors to a servicemember on active duty is in-
herently incident to service.20 9 Atkinson's suit did not involve a factual
situation in which the military discipline analysis could be used because
it fell into a category already barred by Feres cases. This fact does not
suggest, however, that new categories of claims cannot be allowed recov-
ery through the application of the military discipline analysis. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit seems to have restrained its future application of the mil-
itary discipline analysis by interpreting Johnson III so broadly.
b. Walls v. United States
The Seventh Circuit applied a hybrid version of the Johnson III
and Shearer 11 approaches. In Walls v. United States2 10 the Seventh
Circuit restated the three rationales mentioned in Johnson III, but
based its decision on whether military discipline would be affected ad-
versely by this suit. 1 ' In Walls an active-duty servicemember caught a
ride from Colorado to Utah with an army helicopter pilot on an aero
club plane. Because of the pilot's alleged gross negligence and the aero
club's insufficient supervision, the plane crashed, causing Walls to be
injured.212 Walls retired and began receiving veteran's benefits.21 3 The
court stated that the issue was whether Walls was acting incident to
service when the aero club plane crashed. 214 The court stated that the
207. 825 F.2d at 205-06. These two rationales are the distinctively federal rationale and the
uniform compensation rationale. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
208. See Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 58 n.4.
209. Shearer I, 723 F.2d at 1106. See supra note 184. There have been several attempts by
Congress to allow servicemembers to bring medical malpractice suits, but all these attempts have
failed. See H.R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
210. 832 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1987).
211. Id. at 95-96.
212. Id. at 94.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 95.
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rationales supporting Feres, and the subsequent decisions interpreting
Feres' application, necessitated a holding that Walls' suit was barred. 1 '
The court stated that the Supreme Court had denied recovery in
Johnson III because the servicemember was killed incident to ser-
vice.216 While restating the three rationales for Feres mentioned in
Johnson III, the Walls court recognized that the military discipline ra-
tionale was the most important. 1 ' The court held that allowing ser-
vicemembers to bring suit for injuries sustained while involved in aero
club activities could threaten military discipline. 18 The court stated
that even if a servicemember is on-leave or off-duty when injured, he
cannot recover under Feres if the injury occurred while the ser-
vicemember was taking advantage of privileges generally restricted to
the military.1 9 Precedent supported this holding.220 In the instant case,
Walls was on active duty at the time of the injury and subject to mili-
tary jurisdiction. Moreover, he was only eligible to be a member of the
aero club because of his service in the armed forces. 221 His injuries,
therefore, were related directly to his military status. Thus, the Walls
court found that "the circumstances of th[e] case fall within the heart
of the Feres doctrine as it consistently has been articulated. '222
The Seventh Circuit in Walls read Johnson III narrowly and de-
nied recovery based on the court's determination that the plaintiff's in-
juries were incurred incident to service. Like Atkinson II, this case falls
into a category of cases that consistently have denied recovery under
Feres.225 Yet, the court did not make a per se denial, but rather looked
at the circumstances in order to determine if the injuries were incurred
incident to service and to determine if military discipline might be
affected.
The Seventh Circuit decision in Walls reflects confusion as to how
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. The Court stated that the fact that the servicemember had received veteran's bene-
fits, in and of itself, would not preclude his recovery. The court noted that the Shearer If Court
also adopted this position. Id. at 95 n.3.
218. Id. at 95.
219. Id.
220. Id. The court cited Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979), and Her-
reman v. United States, 476 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1973).
221. Walls, 832 F.2d at 95. The court stated that air force aero clubs are closely connected to
the armed forces in that they are established and operated by the Air Force. The clubs were cre-
ated to promote morale among members of the military by providing recreational activities. More-
over, only active-duty servicemembers are eligible for "active membership" in aero clubs. Aero
clubs are strictly controlled by the Air Force. Id. at 94 n.2.
222. Id. at 96 (quoting Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2069).
223. See supra note 107. Walls is a part of a category of cases known as the "recreational
cases" that apply the privileged activity test.
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to reconcile Shearer 11 and Johnson III. Once the court found that
Walls was injured in a factual situation categorically deemed incident
to service by Feres and its progeny, the court did not need to determine
whether the suit would affect military discipline. If the case falls into a
category of cases deemed incident to service then the Supreme Court
supposedly has already determined that military discipline will be af-
fected if these types of suits are generally permitted.
c. Major v. United States
In Major v. United States224 two active-duty servicemembers were
on base and were hit by a servicemember who was driving while intoxi-
cated. The Sixth Circuit held that the injuries were sustained incident
to service and, therefore, denied recovery.225 The court began its analy-
sis by looking at the decisions in Shearer II and Johnson IL The Ma-
jor court stated that Shearer 11 held that the relevant inquiry is not
where the incident occurred, but "whether the suit requires the civilian
court to second-guess military decisions. '226 Similarly, the Johnson III
court found that the status of the tortfeasor was irrelevant in determin-
ing whether Feres applied. The court stated that if the injury oc-
curred while the plaintiff was involved in a "service-related" mission,
suit would be dismissed under Johnson III because its "maintenance
would 'necessarily implicate[] the military judgments and decisions in-
extricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.' ",228
The Major court stated that the Supreme Court in recent cases
seemed dedicated to broadening the Feres doctrine to include all inju-
ries sustained by servicemembers, regardless of how distantly related
the injuries are to the individual's status as a member of the military.229
The court recognized that the Supreme Court has denied recovery re-
gardless of the location of the event, the status of the tortfeasor, or any
connection between the incident and the military purpose of the activ-
ity from which it arose.230 The court also stated that the rationale in
Brooks, to allow recovery if the accident had nothing to do with the
plaintiff's army career, had been greatly undermined by the Johnson
III and Shearer II opinions.231
Yet, the Sixth Circuit, while recognizing the bleak outlook for
224. 835 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1987).
225. Id. at 642.
226. Id. at 644 (quoting Shearer II, 473 U.S. at 57).
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2069).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 645 n.2.
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Feres-type claims, did not bar this claim per se or give undue weight to
the two original rationales reintroduced in Johnson III, instead the
court looked at the claim's effects on military discipline. After the court
found that this suit would affect military discipline and effectiveness, it
barred recovery.23 2 While the court paid lip service to Johnson III, it
did not deny recovery because of Johnson III's reaffirmance of Feres,
but rather based its decision on the suit's effect on military
discipline. 3
C. Summary of the Lower Courts' Interpretation of Johnson III
Analyzing the lower courts' interpretation of Johnson III reveals
two apparent trends. First, it appears that Johnson III has neither put
a stop to litigation nor closed the door previously opened by the lower
courts that allowed recovery to servicemembers in actions which are
"unrelated to the military command structure. '23 4 Some of the courts,
while paying lip service to Johnson III, really are applying the same
analysis that they would have applied before Johnson III. Impairment
of military discipline remains the primary reason for denying recovery
despite Johnson III's reliance on two of the original Feres rationales.
Second, the courts appear to be confused as to how to reconcile
Johnson III and Shearer II. Shearer II relied primarily on the military
discipline rationale to deny recovery. Johnson III would have denied
recovery if the injury occurred incident to service regardless of the
claim's effect on military discipline. The lower courts, however, appear
to determine first whether the claim is incident to service and then go
on to determine if military discipline will be affected. If the claim is
incident to service, recovery should be denied. Shearer II added to the
confusion by defining incident to service based on whether military dis-
cipline would be affected. For years the courts have been grounding
their decisions on the suits' effects on military discipline; Shearer II
simply took the analysis to the extreme.
Johnson III appears to be a reaction to Shearer II. The Johnson
III Court was alarmed by the lower courts' use of Shearer 11 because
the Supreme Court seems to want the military discipline rationale to be
used to define incident to service only when it serves to deny recovery.
Thus, Johnson III did not overrule Shearer II, but merely stated that if
the accident is incurred incident to service then it does not matter if
232. Id. at 645.
233. Because this fact situation did not fall into a fact situation categorically barred by
Feres, and because Shearer II stated that duty status and situs of the event are noncontrolling, the
Court was correct in applying the Shearer II military discipline analysis.
234. See Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21, col. 2.
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military discipline is unaffected.
V. THE FUTURE IMPACT OF Johnson III
Johnson 111235 should not affect the categories of cases that already
are barred by Feres, including medical malpractice claims, derivative
tort claims, suits against officers in their individual capacities, and priv-
ileged activity suits.2"6 Johnson III merely reaffirms that these claims
are barred regardless of the instant claim's effect on military discipline.
Johnson III should apply to any claims by servicemembers against ci-
vilian employees of the federal government. This generalization, how-
ever, does not mean that Johnson III will preclude recovery in all suits
against civilian federal employees. In Johnson III the civilian agency
sued was involved intimately with the military. Yet, the Court has not
addressed the question of whether recovery will be allowed in suits
against civilian employees of the government who are not involved
closely with the military. Moreover, the plaintiff in Johnson III was
engaged in a military mission at the time of his death. Johnson III says
nothing about suits against civilian employees of the government which
are brought by servicemembers who did not sustain injury on a military
mission.37 Johnson III should be recognized for what it is: an extension
of the Feres doctrine to suits brought by military personnel injured in-
cident to service against civilian government employees who are in-
volved intimately in military activities.
Finally, it is likely that Feres will be overruled. The plaintiff in
Johnson III did not ask the court to overrule Feres.2 38 But if she had,
four of the nine justices might have accommodated her and overruled
Feres. ss Furthermore, with the resignation of Justice Powell, who wrote
235. Johnson III may have an interesting effect on Agent Orange suits. See Doctrine Re-
mains, supra note 86, at 37, col. 1; Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21, col. 2. If the plaintiffs
sue the officers individually then they will be barred by United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3084
(1987). Doctrine Remains, supra note 86, at 37, col. 1; Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21,
col. 2; see supra note 107. If the plaintiffs argue that the CIA is responsible then they will probably
be barred by Johnson III. See Doctrine Remains, supra note 86, at 37, col. 1. The same questions
may arise from the Challenger shuttle catastrophe. If the servicemembers' families sue NASA,
then Johnson III should apply. Id. If the plaintiffs sue Morton Thiokol, Inc., the rocket maker,
then Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988), would probably preclude recov-
ery. Id.
236. See supra note 107.
237. For example, one commentator asks what would happen "if a West Point cadet is struck
by a bullet negligently fired by an FBI agent at an Army-Navy game," or a servicemember is run
over by a post office truck on base? See Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21, col. 3. Recovery
against the FBI will probably be precluded by Johnson III. Id. The suit against the post office,
however, may be allowed because the post office is not intimately involved in military activities.
238. Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2070 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Feres Holding Lives,
supra note 8, at 21, col. 2.
239. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in Justice Scalia's dissent.
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the majority opinion in Johnson III, the continued viability of Feres
will depend a great deal on Justice Kennedy.2 40 Coming from the Ninth
Circuit, which historically has been very hostile to the Feres doctrine,
Justice Kennedy may be more prone to overrule Feres.241
VI. CONCLUSION
The Feres doctrine has been criticized extensively by courts and
commentators.242 Despite any stated rationales, the doctrine was cre-
ated by the Supreme Court in order to save the Government from the
dire consequences of large claims and potentially endless FTCA suits
from servicemembers.4 3 Ironically, because of the lower courts' dislike
for Feres and the egregious way that the military often has treated its
servicemembers, the Government has continued to experience the dire
consequences of large amounts of litigation. United States v. Johnson
has facilitated, rather than deterred, this multiplicity of suits.
The Feres doctrine has been criticized because of the inadequacy of
its original rationales and their subsequent replacement by a rationali-
zation of military discipline. 4 The doctrine also has been criticized be-
cause of the harsh results that it creates. Recently, the Court's blatant
inconsistencies in applying the Feres rationales may be the basis for
additional lower court criticisms. Consistent in denying recovery, the
240. See Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21, col. 3.
241. Justice Kennedy authored some opinions in the Ninth Circuit that have been very criti-
cal of the Feres doctrine. See Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1980); Troglia v.
United States, 602 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1979). These cases "reluctantly" uphold Feres, Veillette,
615 F.2d at 506, while pointing out the confusion and "the anomalies created by the court-made
exception to the [FTCA]." Id. at 507. Justice Kennedy, therefore, may agree with Justice Scalia's
argument to overrule Feres in favor of judicial restraint. See supra note 202 and accompanying
text.
242. See Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re "Agent Or-
ange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d
Cir. 1984)); see also supra note 9.
243. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
244. See Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8, at 21, col. 1 (quoting Johnson III, 107 S. Ct. at
2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Danforth, Should the Senate Consent to Bork?, Kansas City
Star, Sept. 13, 1987, at 1K, col. 1. In response to another issue Senator Danforth explained why the
Supreme Court should apply the law as it is written. He stated:
Public policy should be made by those who are elected by the people, report to the people
and can be removed by the people. It should not be made by men and women who have been
elected by no one, who are isolated in courthouses and who serve for life. The Supreme Court
should be in the business of interpreting the law written by elected representatives. It should
not be in the business of creating new law out of whole cloth.
Id. at 6K, col. 5. Senator Danforth was arguing for Senate approval of Judge Bork because Dan-
.forth believed conservative justices would strictly construe the Constitution and federal laws. The
Feres cases testify to the fact that conservative justices can be equally as guilty of "creating law
out of whole cloth." The Feres doctrine has been affirmed and expanded by conservatives and
liberals alike. See generally Feres Holding Lives, supra note 8; Doctrine Remains, supra note 86.
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Court is embarrassingly inconsistent in how it arrives at this result. As
long as lower courts remain hostile to Feres and the Supreme Court
gives little guidance as to the definition of incident to service and the
role military discipline is supposed to play in the Feres analysis, the
litigation will continue.
Shearer 11 used the military discipline rationale to bring activity
that normally would not be considered incident to service under the
Feres bar. When the lower courts in Johnson I and Atkinson I tried to
follow Shearer I and allow recovery by using the military discipline
rationale to define incident to service, the Supreme Court overruled
their analyses. If the Court is going to adopt an analytical structure it
must allow this structure to be used consistently to allow recovery. The
reaction to the Feres doctrine over the last four decades is emblematic
of the problems encountered when the Supreme Court focuses on the
result of the case rather than on defining and confining itself to a logi-
cal analysis.
Johnson III, however, has not done as much damage as the com-
mentators would lead one to believe. Johnson III simply expanded
Feres to include cases against civilian federal employees intimately in-
volved with the military and restricted the use of the Shearer II mili-
tary discipline analysis to categories of cases not barred already by
Feres. The Shearer II analysis cannot be used in every case because
Johnson III showed that factual situations that traditionally have been
found to be incident to service will continue to be found incident to
service, regardless of their actual affect on military discipline. The lower
federal courts, therefore, should continue, and in fact must continue, to
use the Shearer II military discipline analysis in all factual situations
not barred already by Feres if there is to be any chance of recovery at
all.
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